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1 Introduction
A popular approach to analyzing macroeconomic policy posits simple
policy rules and characterizes how alternative policy specifications
perform in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. This line
of work has shown that simple rules seem to explain observed policy
choices quite well and that those rules produce desirable outcomes in
popular classes of dynamic monetary models. Most of the work makes
convenient assumptions that allow monetary and fiscal rules to be
studied separately. Because these assumptions are questionable, it has
long been known that the resulting conclusions could be misleading.
Recent work, particularly the fiscal theory of the price level, empha-
sizes that assumptions about how monetary and fiscal policies interact
can be important.
Research on policy interactions has spawned a number of results
that have become part of the standard reasoning about macroeconomic
policy: (1) an active monetary policy that raises the nominal interest
rate more than one-for-one with inflation—the "Taylor principle"—is
necessary for stability of the economy (Taylor 1993); (2) the Taylor
principle delivers good economic performance in widely used models
(Rotemberg and Woodford 1997, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2006); (3)
high and variable inflation rates may be due to failure of central banks
to obey the Taylor principle, leaving the price level undetermined and
subject to self-fulfilling expectations (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000,
Lubik and Schorfheide 2004); (4) the combination of active monetary
policy and passive tax policy insulates the economy from aggregate
demand disturbances, such as those arising from tax-debt policies
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As with earlier work that focused on monetary or fiscal rules sepa-
rately, the derivation of these results rests on a number of assumptions
of convenience that simplify the nature of monetary and fiscal policy
interactions. The authors usually note that different sets of equally
plausible assumptions may lead to qualitatively different outcomes. For
example, there is now a growing literature providing counter-examples
to the desirability of the Taylor principle (Benhabib and Farmer 2000,
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe 2001a, b, 2002, Zanna 2003).
Perhaps the least plausible assumption in this work is that policy
regime is fixed. This implies that agents always expect the current policy
regime to last forever; regime change, if it occurs, comes as a complete
surprise. A major branch of the applied side of the literature consists
of identifying periods of different policy regimes (Taylor 1999a, 2000,
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000, Auerbach 2002, Lubik and Schorfheide
2004, Sala 2004, Favero and Monacelli 2005). But, as Cooley, LeRoy,
and Raymon (1984) argue, it makes little sense to assume policy mak-
ers are contemplating regime change when agents put zero probability
on this event. Despite the empirical evidence and Cooley, LeRoy, and
Raymon's compelling logic, there is little modeling of environments
where recurring regime change is stochastic and the objects that change
are the rules governing how policy authorities respond to the economy.
1
Davig and Leeper (2006b) show the consequences of regime switch-
ing for determinacy of equilibrium in a simpler context in which lump-
sum taxes passively adjust to satisfy the government budget constraint.
When coefficients of a Taylor (1993) rule evolve stochastically, the
region of determinacy for bounded solutions can expand dramatically
relative to a constant-parameter specification. That paper also shows
in analytically tractable environments that cross-regime spillovers can
change the impacts of exogenous disturbances in quantitatively impor-
tant ways.
This paper extends Davig and Leeper's (2006b) analysis to con-
sider fiscal as well as monetary regime switching. It aims to bring the
applied and theoretical lines of this literature closer together by study-
ing a model with a simple, but empirically plausible, specification of
regime changes. We estimate Markov-switching rules for monetary and
fiscal policy. Monetary policy obeys a Taylor rule that makes the nomi-
nal interest rate depend on inflation and the output gap; fiscal policy
adjusts taxes as a function of government debt and other variables.
All the parameters of the rules, including the error variances, evolve
according to a Markov process. After imposing the estimated policyFluctuating Macro Policies and the Fiscal Theory 249
process on a conventional calibrated dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) model with nominal rigidities, we compute a solution
that is a function of the minimum set of state variables and provide an
interpretation of post-war macro policies.
There are five main findings.
First, the estimates uncover periods of active monetary/passive fiscal
behavior, the policy mix typically assumed to prevail in monetary stud-
ies; there are also episodes of passive monetary/active fiscal behavior,
the mix associated with the fiscal theory of the price level.
2 Remain-
ing periods combine passive monetary with passive fiscal policy or
active monetary with active fiscal behavior. Identification of estimated
switching policy rules is corroborated by connecting estimated regime
changes to narrative accounts of policy behavior.
Second, post-war U.S. data can be modeled as a locally unique
equilibrium: Necessary and sufficient conditions for a solution to the
optimum problem in a DSGE model are satisfied. While our empirical
results are largely consistent with existing estimates from fixed-regime
models, we avoid the necessary implication of those models that the
economy lurched unexpectedly among periods of indeterminacy (pas-
sive/passive), non-existence of equilibrium (active/active), or unique
equilibria with completely different characteristics (active monetary/
passive fiscal or passive monetary/active fiscal) (see, for example, Clar-
ida, Gali, and Gertler 2000, Lubik and Schorfheide 2004, or Sala 2004 for
such interpretations). Instead, in a regime switching setup those peri-
ods are merely alternative realizations of the state vector over which
agents' decision rules are defined. Consequently, in a switching model
the policy episodes have strikingly different implications. For exam-
ple, an empirical finding that over some sub-period monetary policy
has been active and fiscal policy has been passive is perfectly consis-
tent with there being important impacts from (lump-sum) tax shocks.
A finding that both monetary and fiscal behaviors have been passive
need not imply the equilibrium is indeterminate. And the economy can
temporarily experience active/active policies without dire economic
consequences.
Third, the fiscal theory of the price level is always operative. Shocks
to (lump-sum) taxes always affect aggregate demand, even when the
rules in place at a given moment would suggest that Ricardian equiv-
alence should hold if regime were fixed. The fiscal theory is operat-
ing whenever economic agents believe it is possible for fiscal policy to
become active. Then a cut in current taxes, financed by sales of nominal250 Davig and Leeper
government debt, does not generate an expectation that future taxes
will rise by at least enough to service the new debt. The tax reduction
leaves households feeling wealthier, at initial prices and interest rates,
and they perceive they can raise their consumption paths.
3 When nomi-
nal rigidities are present, the expansion in demand for goods raises out-
put and inflation. Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2004) show analytically
that in a related regime-switching environment, a unique bounded
equilibrium exists; in that equilibrium, the fiscal theory is always at
work, as long as agents believe there is a positive probability of moving
to a regime with active fiscal policy.
Fourth, the fiscal theory mechanism is quantitatively significant in
U.S. data, according to the model.
4 Through that mechanism alone, a
surprise transitory tax cut of $1 raises the discounted present value of
output in the long run by between 76 cents and $1.02, depending on
which policy regime the simulation conditions. A temporary tax cut of
2 percent of output increases the long-run price level by between 1.2
percent and 6.7 percent, conditional on remaining in a given monetary-
fiscal regime. Similar impacts arise from an anticipated cut in taxes.
Stochastic simulations that draw from the estimated distribution for
policy regime imply that the 80th percentile for the output multiplier
ranges from 43 cents to $1.36 after six years, while a tax cut of 2 per-
cent of output raises the price level between 0.53 to 2.27 percent after
six years. These numbers suggest the fiscal theory mechanism may be
quite potent in U.S. data, helping to reconcile a popular class of DSGE
models for monetary policy with the empirical evidence that tax distur-
bances have important "demand-side" impacts (Blanchard and Perotti
2002, Mountford and Uhlig 2005, and Perotti 2004).
Fifth, viewing time series as generated by recurring regime change
alters how those time series should be interpreted. Many estimates of
policy rules use a priori information about policy behavior in order to
condition on sub-samples in which a particular regime prevailed. This
procedure can obtain accurate estimates of policy parameters and the
impacts of policy disturbances. But embedding the estimated rules in
fixed-regime DSGE models can lead to seriously misleading qualitative
inferences when a regime-switching environment generates the data.
Because long-run policy behavior determines the qualitative features of
data, more accurate inferences can be gleaned from full-sample infor-
mation than by conditioning on regime.
Taken together, the paper's findings lead to a fundamental reassess-
ment of results (l)-(4) that guide macro policy research. The findingsFluctuating Macro Policies and the Fiscal Theory 251
also lead us to argue that to understand macroeconomic policy effects, it
is essential to model policy regimes (or rules) as governed by a stochas-
tic process over which agents form expectations. This argument puts on
the table a new interpretation of macro policies and their impacts.
5
1.1 Why Recurring Regime Change?
Because this paper models regime change as recurring, some motiva-
tion for this modeling assumption is necessary.
Eugene Steuerle (2006), a close observer of U.S. fiscal policy, charac-
terizes pendulum swings (or regime changes) in policy behavior as aris-
ing from two political views toward fiscal policy: The "bargain lunch"
view, by which politicians try to make tax cuts or expenditure increases
appear to be costless, and the "green eye-shade" view, by which deci-
sion makers are ever-wary of the balance-sheet requirements associ-
ated with fiscal choices. For our purposes, the "bargain lunch" view
treats tax decisions as independent of the state of government debt,
while the "green eye-shade" view makes taxes rise with increases in
government debt. This perspective is echoed in the popular press. In
response to rising federal government budget deficits, New York Times
columnist David Brooks writes: "But what can't last won't last. Before
too long, some new sort of leader is going to arise.... He's going to rail
against a country that cannot control its appetites (Brooks 2005)." Even-
tually, when fiscal conditions deteriorate sufficiently, regime change
will occur.
More dramatic recurring changes in both monetary and fiscal poli-
cies occur between wartime and peacetime. During wars—at least
World War Two and the Korean War—spending rises rapidly with no
immediate adjustment in taxes, while monetary policy supports debt
financing by keeping bond prices high (Ohanian 1997, Woodford 2001).
This combination of active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy
tends to be reversed after the fiscal needs of the war have passed.
Some observers—including several participants at the conference—
want to believe that since the appointment of Paul Volcker to be chair-
man of the Federal Reserve in 1979, U.S. monetary policy has been in an
absorbing state with active policy. We don't share this sanguine view.
Central bank governor appointments are political decisions, subject to
the vagaries of the political process. The appointment of Volcker and
subsequently of Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke did not grow out of
institutional reform or legislative change designed to achieve and instill252 Davig and Leeper
low and stable inflation. Indeed, leading up to Bernanke's appointment,
several less-qualified candidates' names were floated. A different set of
political realities at the time might well have produced a very different
nominee whose policies exhibit appreciably less continuity.
Implicit in these examples is the notion that some regime changes
are endogenous responses to the state of the economy—high inflation
leading to the appointment of inflation-fighting central bank gover-
nors—and some changes are exogenous—wartime fiscal financing.
But even endogenous changes have an important exogenous (political)
component: Why wasn't an inflation hawk appointed Fed chairman
earlier in the 1970s, when inflation had already reached double digits?
This paper assumes policy regimes evolve exogenously, leaving endog-
enous change to future work.
6
2 Identification and Estimation of Policy Rules
We seek empirical characterizations of policy behavior that use simple
rules of the kind appearing in the policy literature, but allow for recur-
ring changes in regime. Monetary and tax regimes can switch indepen-
dently of each other. This section reports maximum likelihood estimates
of policy rules whose parameters evolve according to a hidden Markov
chain, as in Hamilton (1989) and Kim and Nelson (1999).
Estimates of simple interest rate rules for monetary policy and tax
rules for fiscal policy are plagued by identification problems because
other omnipresent equilibrium conditions involve similar variables. An
empirical relationship that links a short-term nominal interest rate to
inflation and some measure of output might be capturing monetary
policy behavior or it might simply reflect the correlations that a Fisher
equation induces among the nominal rate, the real rate, and expected
inflation. Similarly, a regression of taxes on lagged debt might describe
how fiscal authorities raise taxes in response to increases in govern-
ment indebtedness or it might arise from the positive correlation that
the government budget constraint creates between the value of debt
and expected future primary surpluses.
These problems are particularly acute in single-equation regressions
that assume policy follows simple rules with constant coefficients:
nothing distinguishes a "policy rule" from some other equilibrium con-
dition. Positing that policy behavior shifts discretely, as we do in our
estimated policy rules and in the subsequent theory, can help to dis-
tinguish policy behavior from the other equilibrium conditions, whichFluctuating Macro Policies and the Fiscal Theory 253
would not be expected to exhibit time variation that coincides with
policy shifts.
7 A key step in identifying regime-switching policy rules
corroborates the timing and nature of estimated regime changes with
extra-sample evidence from other studies of policy behavior. This sec-
tion also reports that evidence.
2.1 Specifications
For monetary policy, we estimate a standard Taylor (1993) specifica-
tion, which Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) have shown is nearly opti-
mal in the class of models we consider in section 3. The rule makes the




M is the monetary policy regime and e\ ~ N(0, a
2). Regime
evolves according to a Markov chain with transition matrix P
M. r and it
are net rates. We allow for four states, with the parameters restricted to
take only two sets of values, while the variance may take four different
values. P
M is a 4 x 4 matrix.
8
Unlike monetary policy, there is no widely accepted specification for
fiscal policy.
9 We model some of the complexity of tax policy with a
rule that allows for the revenue impacts of automatic stabilizers, some
degree of pay-as-you-go spending, and a response to the state of gov-
ernment indebtedness. The rule links revenues net of transfer payments,
rt, to current government purchases, gt, the output gap, and lagged debt
held by the public, bt_v The specification is:
*, = /o(Sf ) + USf)bt_1 + 7y{S
¥t)yt + 7gtf )gt +ar(Sf)e
rtt (2)
where S(
f is the fiscal policy regime, which obeys a Markov chain with
transition matrix P
f, for the two fiscal states, and e
rt ~ N(0, G
1). Both (1)
and (2) allow for heteroskedastic errors, which Sims and Zha (2006)
emphasize are essential for fitting U.S. time series.
Let St = (St
M, St
F) denote the joint monetary /fiscal policy state. The
joint distribution of policy regimes evolves according to a Markov
chain with transition matrix P = P
M ® P
F, whose typical element is p.. =
Pr[S( =; I Stl - i], where E.p. = 1. With independent switching, the joint
policy process has eight states.254 Davig and Leeper
2.2 Estimation Results
We use quarterly U.S. data from 1948:2 to 2004:1. To obtain estimates of
(1) that resemble those from the Taylor rule literature, we define nt to be
the inflation rate over the past four quarters. Similarly, estimates of (2)
use the average debt-output ratio over the previous four quarters as a
measure of btr
The nominal interest rate is the three-month Treasury bill rate in the
secondary market. Inflation is the log difference in the GDP deflator.
The output gap is the log deviation of real GDP from the Congressional
Budget Office's measure of potential real GDP. All fiscal variables are
for the federal government only, r is federal tax receipts net of total
federal transfer payments as a share of GDP, b is the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas' market value of gross marketable federal debt held by
the public as a share of GDP, and g is federal government consumption
plus investment expenditures as a share of GDP. All variables are con-
verted to quarterly values.
Parameter estimates are reported in tables 4.1 and 4.2 (standard errors
in parentheses) and estimated transition matrices are in table 4.3.
1
0
Associated with each set of monetary policy parameters is a high-
and a low-variance state.
1
1 Monetary policy behavior breaks into peri-
ods when it responds strongly to inflation (active policy) and periods
when it does not (passive policy). In the active, volatile periods, the
standard deviation is 3.7 times higher than in the active, docile periods;
in passive periods, the standard deviations differ by a factor of seven.
Passive regimes respond twice as strongly to the output gap, which is
consistent with the Fed paying relatively less attention to inflation sta-
bilization. There are also important differences in duration of regime.
Active regimes last about 15 quarters each, on average, while the dura-
tion of the docile passive regime is over 22 quarters; the volatile passive
regime is most transient, with a duration of 11.6 quarters.
Tax policies fluctuate between responding by more than the quar-
terly real interest rate to debt (passive) and responding negatively to
debt (active). The active policy is what one would expect over the busi-
ness cycle, with revenues and debt covarying negatively. Active policy
reacts strongly to government spending, though by less than one-to-
one, while passive policy reacts more weakly. In both regimes taxes rise
systematically and strongly with the output gap, as one would expect
from built-in stabilizers in the tax system. A stronger response to outputFluctuating Macro Policies and the Fiscal Theory 255
Table 4.1















































Tax Policy Estimates. Log Likelihood Value = -765.279
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Monetary and Fiscal Policy Transition Matrices
.9349 .0651 .0000 .0000'
.0000 .9324 .0444 .0232
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.0000 .0332 .0529 .9139
T.9372 .06281
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under passive policy is consistent with active policy pursuing counter-
cyclical objectives more vigorously.
2.3 Plausibility of Estimates
We consider several checks on the plausibility of the estimated rules.
First, are the estimates reasonable on a priori grounds? We think they
are, as the rules fluctuate between theoretically interpretable regimes.
Monetary policy fluctuates between periods when it is active, satisfy-
ing the Taylor principle (an > 1), and periods when it is passive (aK < 1).
Passive tax policy responds to debt by a coefficient that exceeds most
estimates of the quarterly real interest rate (and by more than the cali-
brated real rate in the DSGE model below), while active tax policy low-
ers taxes when debt is high.
Second, how well do the estimated equations track the actual paths
of the interest rate and taxes? We use the estimates of equations (1)
and (2), weighted by the estimated regime probabilities, to predict the
time paths of the short-term nominal interest rate, r, and the ratio of
tax revenues to output, r, treating all explanatory variables as evolving
exogenously. The predicted—using smoothed and filtered probabili-
ties—and actual paths of r and z appear in figures 4.1 and 4.2. These fits
are easily comparable to those reported by, for example, Taylor (1999a)
for monetary policy.
1
2 The interest-rate equation goes off track in the
1950s, suggesting that period might constitute a third distinct regime,
but in three-regime specifications the response of policy to output was
negative. The tax rule tracks the revenue-output ratio extremely well,
except in the last year or so when revenues dropped precipitously.
2.4 Corroborating Evidence: Individual Policy Processes
A third check on the plausibility of the estimates, which is a critical step
in identifying policy behavior, asks whether the periods estimated to
be active and passive correspond with narrative accounts of policy his-
tory.
1
3 The estimated marginal probabilities of the monetary and fiscal
states are plotted in figures 4.3 and 4.4. All probabilities reported are at
time t, conditional on information available att-1.
Figure 4.3 reports that, except for a brief active period in 1959-60,
monetary policy was passive from 1948 until the Fed changed oper-
ating procedures in October 1979 and policy became active. Mone-


























































































































































Smoothed (Solid Line) and Filtered (Dashed Line) Estimated Probabilities
recessions in 1991 and 2001. For extended periods during the so-called
"jobless recoveries," monetary policy continued to be less responsive to
inflation for two or more years after the official troughs of the down-
turns. The passive episode in 1991 became active when the Fed launched
its preemptive strike against inflation in 1994.
These results are broadly consistent with previous findings. From
the beginning of the sample until the Treasury Accord of March 1951,
Federal Reserve policy supported high bond prices to the exclusion of
targeting inflation, an extreme form of passive monetary policy (Wood-
ford 2001). Through the Korean War, monetary policy largely accom-
modated the financing needs of fiscal policy (Ohanian 1997). Romer
and Romer (2002) offer narrative evidence that Fed objectives and
views about the economy in the 1950s were very much like those in
the 1990s, particularly in its overarching concern about inflation. ButFluctuating Macro Policies and the Fiscal Theory 261
Romer and Romer (2002, p. 123) quote Chairman William McChesney
Martin's congressional testimony, in which he explained that "the
1957-58 recession was a direct result of letting inflation get substan-
tially ahead of us." The Romers also mention that FOMC "members
felt they had not reacted soon enough in 1955 [to offset the burst of
inflation]" (p. 122). To buttress their narrative case, the Romers estimate
a forward-looking Taylor rule from 1952:1-1958:4. They conclude that
policy was active: The response of the interest rate to inflation was 1.178
with a standard error of 0.876. Our estimate of this response coefficient
in passive regimes is 0.522, which is less than one standard error below
the Romers' point estimate. The Fed might well have intended to be
vigilant against inflation, but it appears not to have acted to prevent
the 1955 inflation. The brief burst of active monetary policy late in 1959
and early in 1960 is consistent with the Romers' (2002) finding that the
Fed raised the real interest rate in this period to combat inflation. From
1960-1979, monetary policy responded weakly to inflation, while since
the mid-1980s the Fed has reacted strongly to inflation, a pattern found
in many studies (Taylor 1999a, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000, Romer
and Romer 2002, and Lubik and Schorfheide 2004).
The estimates of passive monetary policy behavior following the
1991 and 2001 recessions are likely to conflict with some readers' pri-
ors. Other evidence, however, corroborates the estimates. As early as
March 1993, after the federal funds rate had been at 3 percent for sev-
eral months, during policy deliberations Governors Angell, La Ware,
and Mullins expressed concern that the Fed was keeping the rate low
for too long. Angell warned that "our progress to get inflation down
low enough so it [isn't a factor affecting] any business decision is now
in jeopardy" (p. 30) (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
1993a). At that March FOMC meeting, Governors Angell and Lindsey
dissented on the vote to maintain the funds rate at 3 percent. Six months
later, Mullins analogized 1993 to the 1970s as another "period in which
perhaps short rates weren't appropriately set to track inflation" (p. 11)
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1993b).
More recently, close observers of the Fed have expressed similar
concerns, citing the rapid growth in liquidity in 2003 and 2004 and
the exceptionally low real interest rates since 2001 (Unsigned 2005a,
b). Financial economists list unusually low interest rates as an impor-
tant factor behind the spectacular growth in household and corporate
debt in recent years (Unsigned 2002 and Roach 2004). These senti-
ments about monetary policy behavior in the early 1990s and 2000s are262 Davig and Leeper
consistent with our estimates that the Fed responded only weakly to
inflation in those periods.
Estimates of the tax rule in (2) reveal substantially more regime insta-
bility than for monetary policy. Over the post-war period, there were 12
fiscal regime changes, with tax policy spending 55 percent of the time in
the active regime. Figure 4.4 shows that the model associates tax policy
with regimes that accord well with narrative histories. Fiscal policy was
active in the beginning of the sample. Despite an extremely high level of
debt from World War Two expenditures, Congress overrode President
Truman's veto in early 1948 and cut taxes. Although, as Stein (1996)
recounts the history, legislators argued that cutting taxes would reduce
the debt, the debt-GDP ratio rose while revenues as a share of GDP fell.
In 1950 and 1951 policy became passive, as taxes were increased and
excess profits taxes were extended into 1953 to finance the Korean War,
consistent with the budget-balancing goals of both the Truman and the
Eisenhower Administrations. From the mid-50s, through the Kennedy
tax cut of 1964, and into the second half of the 1960s, fiscal policy was
active, paying little attention to debt. There followed a period of about
15 years when fiscal policy fluctuated in its degree of concern about
debt relative to economic conditions.
President Carter cut taxes to stimulate the economy in early 1979, ini-
tiating a period of active fiscal policy that extended through the Reagan
Administration's Economic Recovery Plan of 1981. By the mid-1980s,
the probability of passive tax policy increased as legislation was passed
in 1982 and 1984 to raise revenues in response to the rapidly increas-
ing debt-output ratio. Following President Clinton's tax hike in 1993,
fiscal policy switched to being passive through the 2001 tax cut. Presi-




Favero and Monacelli (2005) estimate switching regressions similar
to (1) and (2) and also find that monetary policy was passive from 1961
to 1979. In contrast to our results, they do not detect any tendency to
return to passive policy following the 1991 and 2001 recessions, though
they estimate one regime, which occurs in 1985:2-2000:4 and 2002:2-
2002:4, in which the monetary policy response to inflation is exactly
unity. Their estimates of fiscal policy are not directly comparable to
ours because Favero and Monacelli use the net-of-interest deficit as
the policy variable, which confounds spending and tax policies. Like
us, they find that fiscal policy is more unstable than monetary policy.
1
5
Our findings are also consistent with the time-varying monetary policyFluctuating Macro Policies and the Fiscal Theory 263
rule estimates of Kim and Nelson (2006). They find that the response of
monetary policy to inflation is not different from unity in the 1970s and
the 1990s.
2.5 Corroborating Evidence: Joint Policy Process
It is convenient, and does no violence to the qualitative predictions of
the theory in the next sections, to aggregate the four monetary states
to two states. We aggregate the high- and low-variance states for both
the active and the passive regimes, weighted by the regimes' ergodic
probabilities. An analogous transformation is applied to the estimated





and variances are o
2r{St = Active) = 4.0576e - 6 and o
zr (St - Passive) =
1.8002e - 5. Combining this transition matrix with the one estimated for
fiscal policy yields the joint transition matrix
.8908 .0597 .0464 .0031
.0494 .9011 .0026 .0469
.0164 .0011 .9208 .0617
.0009 .0166 .0511 .9314
(4)
Probabilities on the main diagonal are P[AM/PF\AM/PF], P[AM/
AFIAM/AF], P[PM/PF IPM/PF), and P[PM/AF IPM/AF]. The transi-
tion matrix implies that all states communicate and each state is recur-
ring, so the economy visits each one infinitely often.
Figure 4.5 shows that the joint probabilities computed using (4) also
correspond to periods that have been noted in the literature. Both pol-
icies were passive in the early 1950s, when the Fed supported bond
prices (and gradually phased out that support) and fiscal policy was
financing the Korean War. From the late 1960s through most of the
1970s, both policies were again passive. Arguing this, Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (2000) claim the policy mix left the equilibrium undeter-
mined, allowing for bursts of inflation and output from self-fulfilling
expectations. Using data only from 1960-1979, it is easy to see how one
might reach this conclusion. The early-to-mid-1980s, when monetary
policy was aggressively fighting inflation and fiscal policy was financ-
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active policies. Finally, the mid-1980s on is largely a period of active
monetary and passive fiscal policies, as most models of monetary pol-
icy assume (for example, the papers in Bryant, Hooper, and Mann 1993
and Taylor 1999b).
Taken together, the marginal and joint probabilities paint a picture
of post-war monetary and fiscal policies that is broadly consistent with
both narrative accounts and fixed-regime policy rule estimates.
A final check on the plausibility of the estimates asks if the policies
make economic sense when they are embedded in a conventional DSGE
model. Sections 6 and 7 answer this question in detail.
3 A Model with Nominal Rigidities
We employ a conventional model with monopolistic competition and
sticky prices in goods markets, extended to include lump-sum taxes and
nominal government debt.
1
6 Although the model is standard, because
we intend to solve it in its full nonlinear form, it is worthwhile briefly
reviewing the specification.
3.1 Households
The representative household chooses {C(, Nt, Mt, Bt} to maximize
Qi-o Ni+v (M . / p y~
K
—Lti y 1±!— + § 1+1 t±l
l-o- I + 77 I-*
with 0 < j5 < 1, <7> 0, r\ > 0, K> 0, % > 0/
 and S> 0.
1
7 Cf is a composite con-
sumption good that combines the demand for the differentiated goods,
ct, using a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator:
9
The household chooses ct to minimize expenditure on the continuum
of goods indexed by the unit interval, leading to the demand functions
for each good j
c,, (7)
where Pt = [l\p]~
0 dj]
in~
e is the aggregate price level at t.266 Davig and Leeper




where Tt is lump-sum taxes/transfers from the government to the
household, Bt is one-period nominal bonds, Qt M is the stochastic dis-
count factor for the price at t of one dollar at t + 1, and FI( is profits from
the firm, which the household owns. The household maximizes (5) sub-
ject to (8) to yield the first-order conditions
X—— = — (9)
cu=/(£-) ^-
If 1 + rf denotes the risk-free gross nominal interest rate between t and
t + 1, then absence of arbitrage implies the equilibrium condition
[Et(QtM)V = l + rt, (11)
so the first-order conditions imply that real money balances may be
written as
The government demands goods in the same proportion that house-
holds do, so the government's demand is g.f - (pt/Pt)~
eGt, where G( =
Necessary and sufficient conditions for household optimization
are that (9)-(12) hold at all dates and that households exhaust their
intertemporal budget constraints. The latter condition is equivalent to
requiring that the present value of households' planned expenditure is
finite and that wealth accumulation satisfies the transversality condi-
tion (Woodford 2001):
0, (13)
where At = Bt + Mt and ^+1 = QlJl+lPM/Pt.Fluctuating Macro Policies and the Fiscal Theory 267
3.2 Firms
A continuum of monopolistically competitive firms produce goods
using labor. Production of good j is
where Z is aggregate technology, common across firms and taken to be
constant.
Aggregating consumers' and government's demand, firm j faces the
demand curve
where Yt is defined by
Ct + Gt = Yt. (16)
Equating supply and demand for individual goods,
(
Following Calvo (1983), a fraction 1 - (p firms are permitted to adjust
their prices each period, while the fraction q> are not permitted to adjust.
If firms are permitted to adjust at t, they choose a new optimal price, p\,
to maximize the expected discounted sum of profits given by
(18)
'-t+i
where the real profit flow of firm/ at period t, Ut = (p.t/Pt)
1~
9Yt - (Wt/Pt)N.t,
has been rewritten using (17).
 x¥t is real marginal cost, defined as
%=^- (19)
The first-order condition that determines p* can be written as
A_ 1 _iz2 v ^ ; (20)
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which we denote by
(21)
Pt {d-l)K2/







Solving (21) for p* and using the result in the aggregate price index,
pi-* = (l - (p)(pt')
l-
e + (pP\% yields
(24)
where ju= 6/(8-1) is the markup.
We assume that individual labor services may be aggregated linearly
to produce aggregate labor, Nt = j^N.flj. Linear aggregation of individ-
ual market clearing conditions implies ZNt - AtYt, where A( is a measure




Now the aggregate production function is given by
Yt=^Nr (26)
It is natural to define aggregate profits as the sum of individual firm
profits, Flt = i\Tl.tdj. Integrating over firms' profits and combining the
household's and the government's budget constraints yields the aggre-
gate resource constraint
^-Nt=Ct+Gr (27)Fluctuating Macro Policies and the Fiscal Theory 269
From the definitions of price dispersion and the aggregate price index,
relative price dispersion evolves according to
t_!, (28)
where nt = ~PJVtv
Following Woodford (2003), we define potential output, Y
pt, to be the
equilibrium level of output that would be realized if prices were per-
fectly flexible. Potential output, then, emerges from the model when
(p = 0, so all firms can adjust prices every period. The output gap, yt, is
defined as yt = Yt- Y
pt. In this model, with disturbances only to mon-
etary policy and to lump-sum taxes, Y
pt = l.
3.3 Policy Specification
Monetary and tax policies follow (1) and (2), with error terms that are
standard normal and i.i.d. The processes for {Gt, rt, Mt, BJ must satisfy
the government budget identity
given M_j > 0 and (1 + r_^)B_v Government spending is assumed to be a
constant share of output.
3.4 Information Assumptions
Although in the empirical estimates in section 2 regime is a state vari-
able hidden from the econometrician, we do not confront agents in the
model with an inference problem. Instead, we assume agents observe at
least current and past policy shocks and regimes. Under conventional
information assumptions, the model is solved assuming that private




FH,i > 0} plus the initial conditions (M_v (1 + rJBJ. This con-
ventional information structure enables us to quantify the impacts of
unanticipated changes in taxes. We also seek to quantify the effects of
anticipated changes in taxes. Those effects are computed by endowing
agents with foreknowledge of tax disturbances, so the model is solved
using the expanded information set Q* = Q( u {£[+1}-
1
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4 The Fiscal Theory Mechanism
The economics underlying the fiscal theory mechanism potentially
present in the model of section 3 relies on the existence of nominal gov-
ernment debt and particular combinations of monetary and fiscal poli-
cies. An equilibrium condition that is useful for heuristic purposes is
derived by imposing the transversality condition, (13), on the present






The expression states that in equilibrium the real value of nominal gov-
ernment liabilities must equal the expected present value of primary
surpluses plus seigniorage. When this expression imposes restrictions
on the stochastic process for the price level, it does so through the fiscal
theory mechanism. In that case, Cochrane (1999,2001) refers to (30) as a
"debt valuation" equation because fluctuations in surpluses or seignior-
age can induce jumps in Pt, which alter the real value of debt to keep
it consistent with expected policies.
1
9 Conventional monetary analysis,
in contrast, assumes that monetary policy is active and fiscal policy
is passive, so (30) holds via adjustments in future surpluses, without
imposing any restrictions on the {Pt} process (for example, Woodford
2003).
Consider the simple case of an exogenous process for the net-of-inter-
est surplus (active fiscal policy) and a pegged nominal interest rate (pas-
sive monetary policy).
2
0 A debt-financed cut in taxes does not raise the
present value of future taxes, so it is perceived by households as rais-
ing their wealth. Unlike when productivity or government purchases
change, wealth effects from the fiscal theory do not necessarily stem
from a change in the resources available to the economy.
2
1 Instead, a
tax cut raises the present value of consumption the households believe
they can afford at initial prices and interest rates. This wealth-induced
increase in demand for goods raises output relative to potential, when
nominal rigidities are present. But it must also cause inflation and/or
real interest rates to adjust in order to satisfy (30). With a pegged nomi-
nal interest rate, the increase in inflation lowers the ex-ante real inter-
est rate, ensuring that the demand for goods expands. Condition (30)
emphasizes that it is changes in the present value of primary surpluses
and seigniorage that can trigger fluctuations in aggregate demand,Fluctuating Macro Policies and the Fiscal Theory 271
suggesting that anticipated and unanticipated taxes have symmetric
effects.
Equality between the value of government liabilities and the pres-
ent value of surpluses plus seigniorage is achieved through three chan-
nels, as Woodford (1998a) explains. First, passive monetary policy
endogenously expands the money stock to clear the money market at
the targeted nominal interest rate, creating seigniorage revenue. Sec-
ond, unexpectedly higher inflation revalues outstanding nominal debt.
Third, lower real interest rates—arising from the pegged nominal rate
and higher expected inflation—make it possible to service a higher
level of debt with a given stream of primary surpluses.
If condition (30) imposes restrictions on the equilibrium price level,
as it does in the fiscal theory, then higher expected seigniorage tends to
lower the current price level, an association that seems perverse rela-
tive to conventional monetary theory. Of course, (30) is one of several
conditions for equilibrium. But this informal analysis offers a preview
of the possibility that monetary disturbances may have unconventional
impacts in a fiscal theory equilibrium.
The logic of the fiscal theory mechanism carries over directly to a
regime-switching environment. Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2004) show
that in that environment the fiscal theory is always at work, regardless
of the prevailing regime. As long as there is a positive probability of
moving to a regime with active fiscal policy, agents' decision rules will
reflect that probability and disturbances to current or expected future
taxes will generate wealth effects that affect aggregate demand. This
occurs even if in the current regime fiscal policy is passive and mon-
etary policy is active. Whether this logic is practically relevant depends
on whether the fiscal theory mechanism is quantitatively important.
We now turn to this issue.
5 Calibration
Parameters describing preferences, technology and price adjustment
for the model in section 3 are specified to be consistent with Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2003). The model's frequency is
quarterly. The markup of price over marginal cost is set to 15 percent,
implying ju = 0(1 - G)~
l = 1.15, and 66 percent of firms are unable to reset
their price each period {q> = .66). The quarterly real interest rate is set to
1 percent (/? = .99). Preferences over consumption and leisure are loga-
rithmic (cr= 1, r\ - -1) and % is chosen to make deterministic steady state272 Davig and Leeper
employment 0.2. Each intermediate goods producing firm has access to
a production function with constant returns to labor. The technology
parameter, Z, is chosen to normalize the deterministic steady state level
of output to be 1.
The preference parameter on real balances, 8, is set to ensure that
velocity in the deterministic steady state, defined as cP/M, matches
average U.S. monetary base velocity at 2.4. This value comes from the
period 1959-2004 and uses the average real expenditure on non-dura-
ble consumption plus services. The parameter governing the interest
elasticity of real money balances, K, is set to 2.6 (Mankiw and Summers
1986, Lucas 1988, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2000).
Reaction coefficients in the policy rules are taken from the estimates
in tables 4.1 and 4.2 and the four-state joint transition matrix (4). The
intercepts in the policy rules govern the deterministic steady state val-
ues of inflation and debt-output in the computational model. Intercepts
are set so the deterministic steady state values of variables are com-
mon across regimes and match their sample means from 1948:2-2004:1.
Those values, annualized, are n - 3.43 percent and b = .3525. Govern-
ment purchases as a share of output are fixed in the model at their mean
value of .115.
6 Solution Method and General Characteristics of Equilibrium
This section discusses the qualitative features of the computed equi-
librium. In particular, we argue that the solution is locally unique and
satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium in
the DSGE model. An analytical demonstration of these features is not
available, so we rely on numerical arguments.
6.1 Numerical Algorithm
We compute the solution using the monotone map method, based
on Coleman (1991). The algorithm uses a discretized state space and
requires a set of initial decision rules that reduce the system to a set of
non-linear expectational first-order difference equations. The complete
model consists of the first-order necessary conditions from the house-
holds' and firms' optimization problems, constraints, specifications of
policy, the price adjustment process, and the transversality condition.
The solution is a set of functions that map the minimum set of stateFluctuating Macro Policies and the Fiscal Theory 273
variables, 0f = {btl, wtl, AM, 9t, y/t, St}, into values for the endogenous variables, where w is a wealth measure, defined as wt = Rpt + Mt/Pr
22
6.2 Uniqueness
Because monetary and fiscal regimes are free to change independently
of one another, the model temporarily permits policy combinations
with passive monetary and passive fiscal policies, as well as active
monetary and active fiscal policies. A passive-passive policy combina-
tion leaves the equilibrium undetermined in fixed-regime versions of
the model, admitting the possibility that sunspot shocks affect equilib-
rium allocations. An active-active policy combination implies either no
equilibrium exists or, if it does exist, the equilibrium is non-stationary.
But when regimes obey a Markov process, an active-active mix does
not necessarily violate the transversality condition because agents cor-
rectly impute positive probability to returning to a regime that prevents
debt from growing too rapidly. Similarly, temporarily passive-passive
policies do not necessary leave the equilibrium indeterminate.
2
3
To establish local uniqueness of the equilibrium, we perturb the con-
verged decision rules by a truncated normal random variable at every
point in the state space and check that the algorithm converges back to
the initial set of rules. We repeated this many times and the algorithm
always converged to the initial converged decision rules, which we take
to indicate the decision rules are locally unique.
Establishing uniqueness must also address channels through which
additional state variables may influence equilibrium outcomes. Addi-
tional solutions may exist on an expanded set of state variables, per-
haps including lagged endogenous variables and sunpots. This is a
possibility, but because we use the full nonlinear model derived from
explicit microfoundations, there is limited latitude to intervene in the
state space. The only way in which states outside of the minimum set
can matter is through expectations formation. Allowing additional
states to affect expectations requires moving from the monotone map
to some other algorithm, such as parameterized expectations, which
can allow expectations to be a function of the expanded set of state
variables. Parameterization of expectations requires that one take a
stand on exactly what the additional state variables are and how they
affect expectation formation—for example, sunspots could enter mul-
tiplicatively or additively. Given that there is no theory to guide such274 Davig and Leeper




We also checked how the monotone map algorithm behaves when it
is known there are multiple equilibria or no equilibrium exists. Using
the fixed-regime model with PM/PF policies, the algorithm diverges;
under AM/AF policies, the algorithm converges, but implies a non-
stationary path for debt. The regime-switching DSGE model converges
and produces a stationary path for debt, providing further evidence
that the equilibrium is locally unique and stationary.
Zero expected present value of debt, which the transversality condi-
tion implies, is equivalent to the intertemporal equilibrium condition
bt = xt + zt, (31)
where x and z are the expected discounted present values of future
primary surpluses and seigniorage. We check whether (31) holds fol-
lowing an exogenous shock, conditioning on remaining in each of the
three stationary regimes—AM/PF, PM/PF, PM/AF. We repeat this cal-
culation with random realizations of regimes. The condition is always
satisfied, confirming that the numerical solution is an equilibrium of
the model.
To assess the long-run properties of the model, we compute distribu-
tions using a simulation of 250,000 periods (figure 4.6). The top four
panels are unconditional distributions and the bottom four panels sort
the sample by regime. The simulation randomly draws policy shocks
and policy regimes from their estimated distributions. Three of the
distributions condition on regime—AM/PF, PM/PF, and PM/AF—
are well-behaved, with finite means and variances, as is apparent by
inspection of the bottom four panels.
2
5 The estimated policy rules imply
that debt diverges very slowly under AM/AF policies. Although debt
temporarily follows a non-stationary path, the duration of the AM/
AF regime is not sufficiently long nor is the growth rate of debt high
enough to preclude stationary unconditional distributions for debt and
other variables.
7 Quantifying the Fiscal Theory Mechanism
To quantify the effects of policy shocks, we report results based on two
kinds of impulse response functions. The first conditions on regime to
mimic responses functions usually reported from identified VARs. The
second reflects the "typical" effect of a policy shock by computing the
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Figure 4.6
Distributions: Unconditional and Conditional. Top Four Panels Are Unconditional Dis-
tributions, Taking Draws from Policy Shocks and Regimes; Bottom Four Panels Are
Conditional on Regime, Sorting Observations by Regime. AM/PF (Thick Solid), AM/AF
(Dashed), PM/PF (Dotted-Dashed), PM/AF (Thin Solid)
7.1 Nonlinear Impulse Response Analysis
When conditioning on regime, we assume the initial state of the econ-
omy equals the regime-dependent mean. After perturbing the error
term in a policy rule, we solve for equilibrium time paths, holding the
prevailing regime fixed, and report paths of variables relative to the
baseline of their regime-dependent means. For a policy shock at time t,









k is the decision rule for variable A: as a function of the state




] denotes the mean of x in regime /. Following initial impact,276 Davig and Leeper
policy shocks equal their means of zero and the value of variable k in
period n > tis
<j)
k(e
rt ,£]) = h





kn is a function of the initial shocks because the impulse responses are
history dependent.
Also of interest is the average ("typical") response of a variable, where
the mean is computed over future realizations of regimes. In this case,
the impact period is computed as above, but the generalized impulse
response of variable k in period n > tis given by
& (e
rt ,e]) = h
k (b^, wn_x , A^, 0,0, S „) - h
k (V, w', A', 0,0, /), (34)
where the realization of the decision rule depends on the current real-
ization of regime, Sn. We report various summary measures of the ran-
dom variable <p
k.
7.2 A Fiscal Expansion
In every regime, a cut in taxes is financed by new sales of nominal
government debt and generates wealth effects that increase aggregate
demand, inflation, and output.
Figure 4.7 reports paths following a surprise tax reduction of two
percent of output in period 5, conditional on starting out and staying
in each of the three stationary regimes—AM/PF, PM/AF, and PM/PF.
Regardless of the prevailing regime, the fiscal theory mechanism is
evident. A surprise tax cut raises current and expected inflation. Mon-
etary policy prevents the nominal interest rate from rising as much as
expected inflation, reducing the ex-ante real interest rate and raising
output above potential. In all regimes, the one-period tax cut has per-
sistent effects, lasting over five years when monetary policy is passive
(thin solid and dashed lines) and for many more years when monetary
policy is active (thick solid lines). Figure 4.7 illustrates the three sources
of fiscal financing: inflation jumps unexpectedly on impact, revaluing
debt; the real interest rate falls, raising the expected discounted pres-
ent values of surpluses and seigniorage; future inflation and, therefore,
seigniorage increases.
Active monetary policy appears to dramatically dampen the tax effects
on output and inflation. In fact, a strong response of the nominal inter-
est rate to inflation spreads the responses to taxes over many periods
and actually results in larger long-run effects from fiscal disturbances.Fluctuating Macro Policies and the Fiscal Theory 277
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Figure 4.7
Responses to an i.i.d. Tax Cut of 2 Percent of Output, Conditional on Remaining in the
Prevailing Regime
In a fixed-regime model, the Taylor principle creates explosive infla-
tion dynamics following an i.i.d. shock, so it may seem anomalous that
the inflation process is stationary in the AM/PF regime. Davig, Leeper,
and Chung (2004) show, in an endowment version of this model, that
an AM/PF regime creates wealth effects that make the forecast error
in inflation serially correlated, depending negatively on past inflation
and positively on past real debt. These surprises in inflation are a key
feature of the fiscal theory mechanism, as they serve to revalue debt.
Through the Taylor principle, higher nt raises rt, which increases future
debt service. Because regimes can switch, agents expect some debt ser-
vice to be met with future seigniorage. But the paths in figure 4.7 con-
dition on remaining in the AM/PF regime, so taxes are unexpectedly
high, which reduces aggregate demand and stabilizes inflation.
Generalized impulse response functions bring out the role that the
evolution of regime plays in affecting economic agents' expectations
and choices. Dynamic impacts of policy disturbances display impor-
tant differences from their counterparts in figure 4.7. For the three278 Davig and Leeper
stationary regimes, figure 4.8 plots the mean and one standard devia-
tion bands of the generalized impulse responses following a fiscal
expansion. The first four periods condition on the stationary mean in a
given regime, period 5 imposes the shock and holds regime fixed, and
draws of regimes are taken from period 6 on.
Factoring in future regime changes alters the predictions one makes
about the dynamic path of the economy following a tax cut. An lid. tax
cut initially raises inflation and output more when monetary policy is
passive than when it is active, but under passive monetary policy the
responses also die out more quickly. When the initial regime is AM/
PF, the responses of inflation and output are hump-shaped, resembling
those in identified VAR studies of fiscal policy. The hump arises from
realizations of passive monetary policy regimes, which generate tem-
porary bursts of inflation that are averaged into the responses plotted
in the figure.
7.3 Tax Multipliers
We compute several summary measures of tax effects, both conditional
on the economy remaining in the current regime and unconditional,
AM/PF:n (Change basis pts)
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Responses to an i.i.d. Tax Cut, Given the Regime at the Date of the Shock and Drawing
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averaging across future realizations of regime. The measures quantify
the impacts of a one-time exogenous change in taxes, either unantici-
pated or anticipated.
Table 4.4 reports tax multipliers, computed as the discounted pres-
ent value of additional output generated by a tax cut. The multiplier is
defined as PVn(Ay)/Ar0 = (1/ATO)E"=O^OS(I/S - y), where ^Os is the stochas- tic discount factor. We compute the multipliers for horizons n = 5, 10,
25, and for the long run (<*>) conditional on regime and all but the long
run when future regimes are random.
A one-time $1 surprise tax cut raises the discounted present value of
future output in the long run by $1.02 in the AM/PF regime, by 76 cents
in the PM/PF regime, and by 98 cents in the PM/AF regime. The table
highlights the stronger persistence of output under active monetary
policy, where after 25 quarters the discounted present value of addi-
tional output is only 42 cents. Under passive monetary policy, the addi-
tional effects of the tax cut have largely dissipated after 25 quarters.
The fiscal theory does not sharply delineate between the impacts
of unanticipated and anticipated changes in taxes. As expression
(30) emphasizes, the fiscal theory focuses on how fluctuations in the
expected discounted present value of taxes impact current aggregate
demand. The lower panel of table 4.4 reports output multipliers when
households anticipate a tax cut next period; multipliers are computed
using the expanded information set Q*t, defined in section 3.4. The mul-
tipliers under fore-knowledge of taxes are similar to the multipliers
from a tax surprise, confirming that it is the change in the expected
Table 4.4
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discounted present value of primary surpluses that is central to the fis-
cal theory mechanism.
Table 4.4 shows the proportion of the marginal addition to debt aris-
ing from a tax cut that is backed by an increase in discounted primary
surpluses. Under an AM/PF policy, two-thirds of new debt is backed
by discounted primary surpluses, in contrast to fixed-regime models,
where the proportion is 100 percent. The proportions under PM/PF
and PM/AF are 59 percent and 49 percent. Consequently, the PM/AF
regime experiences the strongest wealth effect on impact from a tax cut,
as figure 4.7 makes apparent. Much of this adjustment arises from the
lower real interest rates that are used to discount future surpluses and
seigniorage.
In the model, it is highly unusual for policy regime to remain
unchanged, as the calculations in table 4.4 assume. Typically, after a
policy disturbance, regimes evolve according to their estimated transi-
tion matrices. Table 4.5 reports 80th percentile ranges for the tax multi-
pliers, computed from 10,000 draws of regimes, using the generalized
impulse response function defined in (34). At the 80th percentile, a $1
tax cut raises the discounted present value of output from 76 cents to
$1.36 after six years, depending on the initial regime.
Table 4.6 reports the price level effects of a one-period tax shock, con-
ditional on regime. In the long run, a transitory tax cut of 2 percent of
output raises the price level by 6.7 percent under AM/PF policies. At a
little over 1 percent, the long-run price effects are substantially smaller
when monetary policy is passive. At shorter horizons, taxes have larger
price effects when monetary policy is passive than when it is active.
Table 4.7 records typical price level impacts, accounting for possible
future regimes. These impacts can be substantial, with the price level
more than 2 percent higher six years after the tax cut. Uncertainty about
realizations of future regimes creates a wide range of possible output
and price level impacts from tax changes, as tables 4.5 and 4.7 attest.
2
6
7.4 Quantitative Sensitivity to Policy Process
In this model, tax shocks matter as long as fiscal policy can be active
some of the time and agents' expectations incorporate this belief. Figure
4.9 shows the immediate impact of a tax shock (positive or negative)
on output and inflation as the percentage of time policy spends in the
AM/PF regime varies from 0 percent to 100 percent. This impact effectFluctuating Macro Policies and the Fiscal Theory 281
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Figure 4.9
Impact Effect of Tax Change on Output and Inflation, Allowing Percentage of Time Policy
Spends in AM/PF Regime to Vary from 0 Percent to 100 Percent
declines monotonically as the ergodic probability of the AM/PF regime
increases.
7.5 A Monetary Expansion
In the model's fiscal theory equilibrium, an expansionary monetary
policy disturbance generates conventional short-run responses—lower
real interest rate and higher output and inflation—but unconventional
longer run impacts—higher real interest rate and lower output and
inflation (figure 4.10). Underlying the transitory monetary expansion
is an open-market purchase of debt that leaves households holding less
government debt. This negative wealth effect is not neutralized in the
model, as it is with a fixed AM/PF regime, because the estimated policy
process implies that future taxes do not fall in the long run by enough
to counteract the decline in wealth from lower debt.
Although the longer run impacts of a monetary disturbance are
unconventional by most criteria, the positive correlation between theFluctuating Macro Policies and the Fiscal Theory 283
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Figure 4.10
Responses to an i.i.d. Monetary Expansion, Conditional on Remaining in the Prevailing
Regime
nominal interest rate and future inflation that appears in figure 4.10
is a feature of many monetary VARs (Sims 1992). This "price puzzle/'
which is discussed in more detail in the next section, is a feature of the
equilibrium generated by the fiscal theory mechanism.
8 Some Empirical Implications
Many studies of monetary policy condition on policy regime and then
estimate policy rules. The estimates are interpreted by embedding
them in a fixed-regime variant of the model in section 3. This section
illustrates some pitfalls of this approach when data are generated by an
environment with recurring changes in policy regimes.
We imagine that the calibrated model with the estimated switching
process generated observed time series. Three sources of stochastic
variation and the model's nonlinearity are sufficient to ensure that a
five-variable VAR fit to taxes, the nominal interest rate, the output gap,
inflation, and the real value of debt is stochastically non-singular. In the284 Davig and Leeper
identified VAR, only the policy rules are restricted. Output, inflation,
and debt are treated as a triangular block which, as in the DSGE model,
is permitted to respond contemporaneously to monetary and tax dis-





Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we impose the response of
taxes to output, but freely estimate the response to debt. Counting
only contemporaneous restrictions, the model is just identified if we
estimate the response of monetary policy to inflation, but impose its
response to output.
The econometrician estimates fixed-regime identified VARs with data
generated by the DSGE model under two different assumptions about
the econometrician's a -priori information. In one case, the econometri-
cian believes the full sample comes from a single policy regime; in other
cases, the econometrician believes regime changes have occurred and
has extra-sample information that identifies which regimes prevailed
over various sub-samples. Simulated data in the first case draws both
policy shocks and regime, while in the other cases the simulation con-
ditions on regime and draws only policy shocks.
2
7 After estimating the
VARs, the econometrician seeks to interpret the findings in the context
of a fixed-regime DSGE model.
The identified VARs obtain accurate quantitative estimates of policy
parameters and the impacts of policy shocks. Table 4.8 reports four sets
of estimates of the feedback parameters an and yb. The "All Regimes"
estimates come from the full sample and the other columns condition
on the indicated regime. All the estimates that condition on regime
recover the correct policy parameters and the associated regimes. The
"All Regimes" estimates suggest that a researcher using a long sample
of data would infer that, on average, monetary policy is passive and
fiscal policy is active.
Figure 4.11 shows estimates of the dynamic impacts of policy shocks
from the identified VARs. Tax disturbances have important impacts
on output and inflation, both conditional on regime and in the full
sample. Active monetary policy diminishes the size of the period-by-
period impacts, but induces such extreme serial correlation that theFluctuating Macro Policies and the Fiscal Theory 285
Table 4.8
Policy Parameters from Identified VAR Estimated on Simulated Data. "All Regimes"
from Stochastic Simulation Drawing from Regime; Others Are Conditional on Regime.
Estimated Equations Are rt = y0 + yyt + ybbtl + e\, rt - a0 + ajtt + cn/f + e
Rt, with yv arid a Restricted to Values Used to Simulate Model. Samples of Length 10,000
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Figure 4.11
Impact of Policy Shocks. Estimated from Simulated Data and Produced by Fixed-Regime
DSGE Model286 Davig and Leeper
total impacts are substantial. Monetary contractions have conventional
short-run effects (lower output and inflation), but unconventional
longer run effects (higher output and inflation), owing to the result-
ing wealth effects engendered by the fiscal theory mechanism. The rise
in future inflation resembles the price puzzle Sims (1992) discovered
in monetary VARs. That puzzle is more pronounced when monetary
policy is passive, consistent with Hanson's (2004) findings that in U.S.
data the puzzle is more severe in samples that include data before 1979,
a period that section 2 labels passive monetary policy. Both the param-
eter estimates and the impulse response functions the econometrician
obtains are quantitatively consistent with those in the switching model
underlying the simulated data (given that the econometrician knows a
and y a priori).
Connecting these quantitative results to fixed-regime theories can lead
to qualitatively misleading inferences. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000)
and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) use different econometric methods,
but both condition on monetary policy regime and both conclude that
since the early 1980s, U.S. monetary policy has been active, while from
1960-1979, monetary policy was passive. Both sets of authors maintain
the assumption that fiscal policy was passive throughout, leading in
their fixed-regime DSGE models to Ricardian equivalence in the recent
sub-sample and indeterminacy in the earlier sub-sample. The results
for AM/PF (thick solid lines) in figure 4.11 are difficult to reconcile
with Ricardian equivalence. Similarly, in the sub-sample where the esti-
mated rules imply PM/PF (thin solid lines), the econometrician would
infer the equilibrium is indeterminate and be compelled to interpret
the policy impacts as arising from correlations between sunspot shocks
and policy shocks. But the simulated data were generated by locally
unique decision rules.
Employing the full sample, the econometrician estimates the policy
impacts shown by dashed lines in figure 4.11. Moreover, using the
"All Regimes" parameter estimates in a fixed-regime version of the
model in section 3, produces the policy impacts represented by lines in
the figure punctuated with x's. In contrast to the estimates that condi-
tion on regime, the full sample estimates deliver qualitatively correct
inferences about policy effects. Correct qualitative inferences require
nailing down the correct long-run behavior of policy. That long-run
behavior is better gleaned from a long sample that includes the pos-Fluctuating Macro Policies and the Fiscal Theory 287





Existing work on policy rules is based on a logical inconsistency: It
assumes regime cannot change and then proceeds to analyze the impli-
cations of alternative regimes. This paper takes a step toward resolv-
ing this inconsistency. A simple and plausible empirical specification
of regime change finds that U.S. monetary and fiscal policies have
fluctuated among active and passive rules. Treating that evidence of
regime change in an internally consistent manner can significantly alter
interpretations of the historical period and of monetary and fiscal poli-
cies more generally. Both the empirical specification and the economic
model are very simple, leaving much room for improving fit to data.
This is an important area for continued research.
This paper has not addressed why policy regimes change. This is a
hard question, but it is the same hard question that can be asked of any
model with a stochastic component to policy behavior. Although Sims
(1987) offers a rationale for why optimal policy might include a compo-
nent that is random to private agents, there is certainly no consensus on
this issue. Lack of consensus, however, does not undermine the utility
of simply postulating the existence of policy shocks and then tracing out
their influence in data and in models. In this paper, we have followed
the convention of assuming some part of policy behavior is random.
Under the working hypothesis of recurring regime change, this paper
shows that when estimated Markov-switching rules for monetary and
tax policies are embedded in a DSGE model calibrated to U.S. data,
lump-sum taxes have quantitatively important effects on aggregate
demand, output, and inflation. In the model, tax non-neutralities arise
because the estimates imply that agents always place positive probabil-
ity mass on an active fiscal regime in the future, a belief that makes the
fiscal theory of the price level operative.
Of course, the fiscal theory is not the only source of tax non-neutrali-
ties in actual data. A full accounting of tax effects requires introducing
some of the panoply of reasons offered for why taxes might be non-
neutral—distortions, life-cycle considerations, and so forth. In any case,
the quantitative predictions of this paper strongly suggest that the fiscal288 Davig and Leeper
theory mechanism should be added to the list of usual suspects for the
breakdown of Ricardian equivalence.
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Endnotes
1. Some work considers recurring regime switching in exogenous processes, including
exogenously evolving policy variables (Andolfatto and Gomme 2003, Davig 2003, 2004,
Leeper and Zha 2003, and Schorfheide 2005). There have also been efforts to incorporate
one-time regime changes into general equilibrium models of the fiscal theory (Sims 1997,
Woodford 1998b, Loyo 1999, Mackowiak 2006, Daniel 2003, and Weil 2003).
2. We apply the terminology in Leeper (1991). Active monetary policy arises when the
response of the nominal interest rate is more than one-for-one to inflation and passive
monetary policy occurs when that response is less than one-for-one. Analogously, passive
fiscal policy occurs when the response of taxes to debt exceeds the real interest rate and
active fiscal policy occurs when taxes do not respond sufficiently to debt to cover real inter-
est payments. In many models, a unique bounded equilibrium requires one active and
one passive policy.
3. See Leeper (1991), Woodford (1994,1995), Sims (1994), and Cochrane (1999,2001).
4. Cochrane (1999) interprets U.S. inflation in light of the fiscal theory and Woodford
(2001) points to particular historical episodes when the fiscal theory might have been
relevant.
5. The table is pretty full. Included among purely monetary interpretations are narra-
tives (DeLong 1997, Mayer 1998, and Romer and Romer 2004), fixed regime (Orphanides
2003a), permanent regime change (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000, and Lubik and Schor-
fheide 2004), adaptive learning (Cogley and Sargent 2005b, 2002, Primiceri 2006, and
Sargent, Williams, and Zha 2006), model uncertainty (Cogley and Sargent 2005a), and
regime-switching identified VARs (Sims and Zha 2006). Work that integrates monetary
and fiscal policy includes Leeper and Sims (1994), Romer and Romer (1994), and Sala
(2004).
6. Davig and Leeper (2006a) examine the implications of making monetary policy
regime change endogenous, maintaining the assumption that fiscal policy is perpetually
passive.Fluctuating Macro Policies and the Fiscal Theory 289
7. See Beyer and Farmer (2005) for a related discussion.
8. Ireland (2004), Leeper and Zha (2001), Leeper and Roush (2003), and Sims and Zha
(2006) argue that allowing money growth to enter the monetary policy rule is important
for identifying policy behavior. To keep to a specification that is comparable to the Taylor
rule literature, we exclude money growth.
9. Examples of estimated fiscal rules include Bohn (1998), Taylor (2000), Fatas and Mihov
(2001), Auerbach (2003), Cohen and Follette (2003), Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay
(2005), and Claeys (2004).
10. To follow existing empirical work on simple policy rules, the paper does not estimate
the rules as parts of a fully specified model. We are reassured in doing this by the model-
based estimates of Ireland (2004) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), which are very close
to single-equation estimates of Taylor rules. It is noteworthy, though, that in an identified
switching VAR, Sims and Zha (2006) conclude that monetary policy was consistently
active since 1960; they do not consider fiscal behavior and their switching specification
is more restricted than ours along some dimensions, but less restricted along others (see
endnote 8).
11. We include a dummy variable to absorb the variability in interest rates induced by
credit controls in the second and third quarters of 1980. See Schreft (1990) for a detailed
account of those controls.
12. Orphanides (2003b) argues that the poor U.S. inflation performance from 1965-1979
was due to a strong policy response to poor estimates of the output gap available at the
time, rather than a weak response to inflation. Using real-time data on the gap and infla-
tion, he claims the fit of a conventional Taylor rule specification is much improved when
real-time data are used rather recent vintage data. Orphanides (2003a) extends this argu-
ment to the 1950s. The fit of our switching regression for monetary policy is far superior
to Orphanides's over the 1960:2-1966:4 period, yet our results label this as a period of
passive monetary policy.
13. This draws on Pechman (1987), Poterba (1994), Stein (1996), Steuerle (2002), Romer
and Romer (2004), and Yang (2006).
14. The negative response of taxes to debt in the active fiscal regime might be regarded
as perverse. A negative correlation arises naturally over the business cycle, as recessions
automatically lower revenues and raise debt. Two active fiscal regimes, the late 1940s and
1973:4-1975:1, almost exactly coincide with the cycle. But there are extended periods of
active behavior, which include but do not coincide with recessions (1955:4-1965:2 and
1978:4-1984:3). There are also instances in which recessions occur during periods of pas-
sive fiscal policy (1990:3-1991:1 and 2001:1-2001:4). Taken together these results suggest
that the tax rule does more than simply identify active regimes with economic down-
turns.
15. Favero and Monacelli (2005) estimate that through 2002, fiscal policy was active in
1961:1-1974:3, 1975:3-1995:1, and 2001:3-2002:4 and passive otherwise. Our estimates
find more periods of passive behavior.
16. Detailed expositions appear in Yun (1996,2005), Woodford (2003), and Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2006).
17. The constant relative risk aversion preferences over real money balances rule out
Obstfeld and Rogoff's (1983) speculative hyperinflations.290 Davig and Leeper
18. See Leeper (1989) and Yang (2005) for further discussion of the implications of fiscal
foresight.
19. In the model all debt matures in one period. Cochrane (2001) emphasizes that with
long-maturity debt, the inflation consequences of a fiscal expansion can be pushed into
the future.
20. This policy mix does not impose a boundary condition on the inflation process, but
it does impose a boundary condition on the real debt process. With nominal liabilities
predetermined, the price level is uniquely determined. This is the canonical fiscal theory
specification (see Woodford 2001 or Gordon and Leeper 2006).
21. Taking a price-theoretic view of the fiscal theory with tax distortions, Leeper and
Yun (2006) refer to this as the "asset revaluation effect," as distinct from conventional
"wealth" and "substitution" effects.
22. Details appear in Appendix A.
23. Davig and Leeper (2006b) provide a detailed analytical proof of determinacy for
bounded solutions under doubly passive monetary and fiscal policies in a linear model
with regime switching in monetary policy.
24. In the monotone map algorithm, it is possible to allow additional state variables to
enter expectations. However, allowing expectations formation to depend on an expanded
state vector does not produce a solution that differs from the locally unique solution.
25. Francq and Zakoian (2001) show that Markov-switching processes can have explo-
sive regimes, yet the entire stochastic process can be stable. Davig (2005) shows that a
properly restricted Markov-switching process for discounted debt can have an explosive
regime, yet satisfy the transversality condition for debt.
26. Appendix B considers an alternative specification of the policy process that increases
the duration of the active monetary policy regime by labeling as active the periods after
the recessions in 1991 and 2001, which section 2 estimated as passive monetary policy.
This reduces the quantitative impacts of tax shocks, though the fiscal theory mechanism
remains important.
27. But the data are generated by decision rules based on the "true" regime-switching
process.
28. Unless there is compelling evidence that agents believe the prevailing regime is per-
manent.
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Appendix A Solution Method
Implementation of the algorithm begins by conjecturing an initial set of rules,
which we take to be the solution from the model's fixed-regime counterpart.
Specifically, we take the solutions from the fixed-regime model with AM/PF
and PM/AF policies as the initial rules for the corresponding regimes in the
non-synchronous switching model. For the AM/AF and PM/PF regimes there
are no stationary, unique fixed-regime counterparts, so we use the solution
from the PM/AF fixed-regime model to initialize the algorithm. To ensure the
solution is not sensitive to initial conditions, we also use the solution from the
AM/PF regime and weighted averages of the two.
Taking the initial rules for labor, /z
N(0() = Nt, and the functions determining
the firm's optimal pricing decision, h
K^(Qt) = Kx t and h
K2(Qt) = K2 (, we find values







N(©t) - g. Given Nt, Kx t, K21, we compute the endogenous
variables. Note that At, bt and wt = Rpt + Mt/Pt are states at t + 1. Gauss-Hermite integration is used over possible values for e
rM, e
Tt+v and SM, yielding values
for Et[xMC~f+1], EtKx j+1, EtK2 (+1, which reduces the above system to three equa- tions in three unknowns. The (net) nominal interest rate is restricted to always
be positive.
When solving the above system, the state vector and the decision rules are
taken as given. The system is solved for every set of state variables definedFluctuating Macro Policies and the Fiscal Theory 297
over a discrete partition of the state space. This procedure is repeated until the
iteration improves the current decision rules at any given state vector by less
than some e - le - 8.
Appendix B An Alternative Policy Process
Many authors have argued that monetary policy has been active since around
1979. Since our empirical estimates indicate two brief episodes of passive mone-
tary policy after 1979, this section conducts a sensitivity analysis that adjusts the
transition matrix to be consistent with an active monetary regime for the entire
post 1979 sample. This exercise highlights that the general message of the paper,
namely that fiscal shocks have important real effects even under AM/PF policy,
carries into an environment with a more persistent active monetary policy.
Our empirical estimates indicate that there are a total of 28 quarters of passive
monetary policy after 1979. Relabeling these periods as active monetary policy
results in 44.2 percent of all periods having active monetary policy. There is no
unique way of adjusting the transition matrix so that 44.2 percent of periods
are active. However, increasing the persistence of the active monetary regime,
instead of decreasing the persistence of the passive regime, is more consistent
with the priors of many researchers that the U.S. has had active monetary pol-
icy since 1979. So, we adjust the transition matrix by increasing the transition
probability of staying in the active regime, conditioning on being in the active
regime, from .9505 to .9779.
To summarize the effects of a more persistent active monetary regime, tables
analogous to those reported in the paper are computed (tables 4.9-4.12). The pro-
portion of new debt backed by discounted surpluses increase in all regimes as
the persistence of the active monetary regime increases. However, the primary
differences that arise relative to the baseline specification occur under AM/PF
policy. Across all time horizons, a more persistent active monetary regime dimin-
ishes the impacts fiscal shocks have on output and inflation. For example, the
increase in all additional discounted output under AM/PF policy arising from a
$1 tax reduction is 61 cents, compared to $1.02 under the baseline specification.
Table 4.9
Output Multipliers for Taxes Conditional on Regime. Uses the Alternative Policy Process
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Table 4.10
Output Multipliers for Taxes, Unconditional. 80th Percentile Bands Based on 10,000
Draws. Uses the Alternative Policy Process That Makes Monetary Policy Active after the




















Cumulative Effect on Price Level of an i.i.d. Unanticipated Tax Cut of 2 Percent of Output.
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1 Introduction
In their contribution to the present volume, Davig and Leeper (hence-
forth, DL) study the implications of variations over time in policy rules.
More specifically, they analyze the equilibrium effects of exogenous
random switches in the coefficients of monetary and fiscal policy rules,
embedded in an otherwise conventional dynamic optimizing model
with staggered price setting. Their motivation for the exercise is an
empirical one: They estimate a Markov switching model for the two
policy rules and find evidence of recurring changes in those coefficients.
Most interestingly, the estimated changes in the policy rules involve
"qualitative" changes in the nature of the regime in place, i.e., they
imply a shift from an "active" to a "passive" monetary policy (or vice
versa), as well as analogous (but not necessarily synchronous) shifts in
the fiscal policy rule. When DL embed their estimated monetary and
fiscal Markov switching processes in a calibrated new Keynesian model
and analyze the implied equilibrium properties, they uncover a num-
ber of interesting results, some of which are summarized below.
Before we turn to some specifics of their analysis, I think it is impor-
tant to stress the central, more general message of the DL exercise: Once
we accept the possibility of a change in the policy regime (and the recog-
nition of that possibility by agents in the model as a logical implication
of the rational expectations assumption), a conventional fixed-regime
equilibrium analysis, i.e., one that treats the regime in place as if it were
to persist forever, may be highly misleading. The fact that the fixed-
regime assumption is common-place in the macroeconomics literature
is somewhat paradoxical, since one of the main stated objectives for the
development of current generation of microfounded DSGE models was
precisely to analyze the implications of policy regime changes.300 Gali
That general message of the DL paper is illustrated by some of their
results. Here are, in my opinion, the most significant ones:
• An equilibrium may exist and be unique even under a "doubly pas-
sive" or a "doubly active" policy regime, i.e., regimes which would
imply, respectively, an indeterminate equilibrium or the non-existence
of a stationary equilibrium, when modeled "as if" they were perma-
nent. Thus, for instance, the empirical violation of the Taylor principle
in the pre-Volcker era detected by several authors (including DL in the
present paper) does not necessarily imply that the equilibrium in that
period was indeterminate or subject to potential sunspot fluctuations,
even if fiscal policy was simultaneously passive.
• Fiscal deficits resulting from changes in lump-sum taxes may be
nonneutral, even under a passive fiscal policy regime. In other words, and
using the authors' language, the mechanisms underlying the fiscal the-
ory of the price level may be effective (to a lesser or greater degree) at
all times. Equivalently, Ricardian equivalence may not hold even if the
conditions under which it has been shown to hold (in a fixed-regime
world) are operating in any given period.
• The dynamic effects of any shock that occurs when a given regime is
in place are not invariant to the characteristics (or the likelihood) of other
possible future regimes. It follows that the use of estimated impulse
responses for the purposes of calibration of "fixed regime models" may
be unwarranted, even if those impulse responses are estimated using
data from a "stable regime" period.
All of those findings share a common feature, which DL refer to as
cross-regime spillovers: The equilibrium properties of an economy under
any given regime are "contaminated" by the characteristics of the other
possible regimes and by the probability distribution describing the
shifts in regime. In other words, once we admit that policy regimes are
subject to change, a description of the current policy regime is not suf-
ficient to characterize the equilibrium dynamics of the economy under
that regime. One needs to know all possible regimes and the probabil-
ity distribution describing the shifts among regimes over time.
Given the forward-looking nature of the models involved, combined
with the assumption of rational expectations, that result may not be
that surprising after all. But the fact that such a result is not surprising
does not mean that it is not important or useful. In some sense it takes
the logic of the Lucas' critique to a higher level: The properties of theComment 301
equilibrium are shown to be a function of the "meta-regime" in place.
As far as I know, DL are the first to analyze this phenomenon explicitly
in the context of a modern, quantitative macro model.
The rest of this comment raises two caveats on DL's paper. The first
has to do with the approach followed in analyzing the uniqueness of
the equilibrium. The second deals with the empirical relevance of the
assumption of recurring regimes.
2 Determinacy Analysis
One of the most striking findings in DL's paper is the claimed coex-
istence of a unique stationary equilibrium with periods characterized
by "doubly passive" and "doubly active" policies. Unfortunately, as
the authors themselves acknowledge, no formal proof of that claim
is provided in the paper. Instead, it is based on the convergence of a
numerical algorithm that searches for decision rules consistent with
equilibrium conditions. The postulated rules contain a minimum set
of state variables as arguments, but that set does not allow for "redun-
dant" state variables, including sunspots. It is thus not obvious that the
mere convergence of the algorithm to a set of decision rules guaran-
tees that those rules are the only ones consistent with equilibrium. The
authors' finding of algorithm divergence when solving for the equi-
librium under a fixed PM/PM regime known to imply indeterminacy
offers some comfort, but is no definitive proof.
An alternative approach, pursued by the authors in a companion
paper in the context of a simpler model (Davig and Leeper 2005),
involves log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions and determining
whether the resulting Markov-switching model satisfies the analytical
conditions for stationarity established in the relevant literature (see, e.g.,
Francq and Zaqoian 2001). Let me illustrate that analytical approach (as
well as a potential caveat) using a simple univariate example.
Suppose that the condition describing the equilibrium behavior of
variable xt is given by the expectational difference equation
where coefficient <pt is possibly time-varying and where, for simplicity,
we ignore the presence of a fundamental driving force. A stationary
solution to the above equation always exists, and is given by xt = 0
for all t. The condition for uniqueness of that stationary solution for
the case of a constant AR coefficient (<pt = (f> for all t) is well known:302 Gali
The above solution is the only one that remains in an arbitrarily small
neighborhood of the steady state whenever 101 > 1. If instead we have
I (j) I < 1 we have an additional set of stationary solutions of the form
where {%t} is an arbitrary random process (a "sunspot") satisfying the
martingale-difference property Ef{£t+1} = 0 for all t.
If we assume instead a Markov process for the AR coefficient <j>t things
change considerably. For the sake of concreteness, let us assume a two-




Any potential sunspot solution to (1) takes the form
where Et{^M} = 0. Furthermore, and under our assumptions, that solu-
tion is generally taken to be an admissible equilibrium if it is stationary.
Francq and Zaqoi'an (2001) derive necessary and sufficient conditions
for stationarity of Markov-switching ARMA processes of which (2) is a
particularly simple case. Their condition implies that (2) may be non-
stationary even if (j)L < 1 (i.e., even if solution (2) would be stationary in
the case of a fixed regime with (pt = (j)L for all t). Roughly speaking, this
will be the case whenever (j)H is sufficiently larger than one and when
the system spends enough time under the (pH regime. In that case, solu-
tion xt = 0 for all t will be the only stationary solution even if 0f recur-
rently takes a value less than one.
The previous result corresponds to DL's claim that their model's
equilibrium may be locally unique even if, recurrently, a regime char-
acterized by passive monetary policy and passive fiscal policy becomes
effective. Their finding thus seems consistent with analytical results
from the literature on Markov-switching processes. One would feel
more confident about DL's uniqueness result if the latter was cross-
checked using the analytical conditions derived in that literature.
That confidence may, however, be unwarranted in light of the find-
ings of a recent paper by Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2006; FWZ,
henceforth). FWZ show that a regime-switching expectational differ-
ence equation may have a multiplicity of solutions as long as one ofComment 303
the recurrent regimes implies such a multiplicity when considered in
isolation, and as long as the economy operates under that regime a
sufficiently large fraction of time. That result holds independently of
the value taken by 0H. For the particular case of the simple univariate
model (1) above, the FWZ solution takes the form
if 0, = 0H>1 (3)
=— fxf_!+7f if 0f=0L<l PL
where {yt} is an arbitrary exogenous martingale-difference process. Notice
that {xt} reverts back to the steady state recurrently, with probability one
as long as pH < 1. Furthermore, as shown by FWZ the assumption I 0LI
< Vp^is sufficient to guarantee stationarity of the global solution. Hence
multiplicity of stationary equilibria appears to arise for a broad range of
parameter values, as long as a regime with 0L < 1 emerges recurrently.
Whether a version of the FMZ result carries over (at least locally) to a
non-linear model, like the one considered by DL in the present paper is
not clear. If it did, one of the key findings of the DL paper, which cur-
rently relies exclusively on the convergence of a numerical algorithm,
would unfortunately turn out to be wrong.
How can one reconcile the FMZ finding with the possibility, under
certain conditions, of a unique equilibrium, as implied by the Francq
and Zaqoian (2001) result discussed above? My conjecture is that the
analysis in the latter paper (and in the related literature) requires that
the error term in the regime-switching process (2) is truly exogenous (as
assumed in conventional ARMA models). By contrast, the FMZ solu-
tion (3) implies
Notice that the previous {£J process satisfies the martingale differ-
ence property E({£,+1} = 0, but it is not exogenous, depending instead
on lagged values of 0f and xt, as well as on the exogenous sunspot
shock yr Note that this kind of solution is not allowed for by DL's solu-
tion method, and it is also inconsistent with regime-switching models
driven by exogenous shocks.304 Gali
3 Empirical Relevance
In the introduction to their paper, DL point to the assumption of a
fixed policy regime commonly made in modern analyses of fiscal and
monetary policy as possibly being the least plausible among the many
assumptions underlying that literature. In spite of that, there are many
reasons for the prevalence of that assumption: It is convenient, it has a
long tradition in economic theory (e.g., in the literature on the effects of
capital income taxation), it allows for comparative dynamics exercises,
and it facilitates the evaluation of a model's predictions. DL's analysis,
however, emphasizes an important shortcoming of the fixed-regime
fiction: The fact that it assumes away the possibility of cross-regime
spillovers.
Of course, one may find DL's case for an explicit modeling of the
possibility of regime changes fully persuasive without necessarily sym-
pathizing with the specific model of regime changes postulated in the
paper, i.e., one characterized by exogenous, recurrent switches between
a finite number of policy regimes. Given that any two different policy
regimes are likely to be rankable in terms of their desirability, it is hard
to understand why policymakers would periodically switch to the least
desirable of those regimes. Furthermore, the exogenous nature of those
switches represents a renewed emphasis on policy randomization, away
from the emphasis on the endogenous component of policy found in
the recent literature.
While few economists would question the empirical relevance
of regime change, I conjecture that most would view non-recurrent
changes as more likely. Two examples of relevant non-recurrent regime
changes come to mind:
• Anticipated "permanent" regime changes: including a stabilization
program aimed at ending high inflation, or the abandonment of an
unsustainable exchange rate peg
• A gradual variation in the policy regime, resulting either from learn-
ing (in an unchanged environment) or from adjustment of optimal
responses to changes in the environment.
Any rational expectations model that incorporates the possibility of
regime changes of that kind is likely to display the central property of
DL's model, namely, the presence of cross-regime spillovers, without
having to rely on the less plausible notion of recurrence.Comment 305
4 Concluding Comments
DL's paper is ambitious and important. Taking it seriously leads to
questioning some results previously thought of as well established
(e.g., the need to satisfy the Taylor principle in order to guarantee a
unique equilibrium). Unfortunately, one key result in the paper (the
global uniqueness of the equilibrium in DL's calibrated model) has
not yet been established in a rigorous way. That notwithstanding, the
importance of cross-regime spillovers emphasized by the authors is
somewhat orthogonal to the issue of indeterminacy and is likely to be
relevant even in the context of switches among regimes which, when
considered in isolation, are associated with a unique equilibrium. Simi-
larly, the significance of those cross-regime spillovers does not hinge
on the questionable Markov switching formalism adopted to charac-
terize regime change in the present paper. In my opinion, much of the
value added in DL's paper and the significance of their contribution lies
in providing a useful illustrative model of the potential importance of
cross-regime spillovers, rather than a model that one should take seri-
ously as a description of post-war U.S. fluctuations and its sources.
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1 Introduction
This is an important and thought-provoking paper. Its basic idea, that
long-run fiscal considerations are central to understanding price and,
in a sticky-price world, output fluctuations, is surely correct. In fact it is
the ability of fiscal policy to create a temporary imbalance between the
value of government liabilities at current prices and their backing by
future tax commitments that is the fundamental source of any impact
of fiscal policy on demand. We see in political rhetoric and popular dis-
cussion that the extent to which current tax and spending policies are
thought appropriately to respond to the amount of outstanding debt
or deficits changes over time, and we need to account for this in our
thinking about monetary and fiscal policy. The paper estimates a model
of time-varying fiscal and monetary policy and embeds it in a cali-
brated equilibrium model to demonstrate that the estimated effects are
important.
The paper makes some dubious assumptions, though, and leaves
some important questions open.
2 Money, Simultaneity
In a recent paper (2006) Tao Zha and I find no evidence of passive mon-
etary policy over the same period studied here by Davig and Leeper. As
Davig and Leeper point out, we allow monetary policy change along
dimensions that are in some ways more restrictive than the Davig and
Leeper setup. However in one important way we are less restrictive:
We allow the policy reaction function to include a monetary aggre-
gate. Why is this important? The general form of the "Taylor princi-
ple" is that the sum of coefficients on percentage changes in all nominal308 Sims
variables, not just inflation, on the right-hand side of the reaction func-
tion must exceed one. If the true reaction function has an important role
for M, but we omit it, other nominal variables are drafted to serve as
error-ridden proxies for it. That their coefficients then sum to less than
one is unsurprising. Also, as Davig and Leeper point out, reaction func-
tion estimation is rife with simultaneity issues. Distinguishing between
reaction functions and the Fisher equation can be difficult. Money in
the reaction function can help make the distinction from the Fisher rela-
tion, but it leaves us still with a simultaneity issue because we need
to avoid contamination with the money demand equation. This paper
follows much of the literature in assuming away simultaneity bias in a
specification without money. Despite the interesting story-telling this
allows, I am not convinced.
A similar issue arises with fiscal policy. Davig and Leeper separate
government's revenue net of transfers from its purchases, but only in
the sense that they enter purchases on the right hand side of a revenue
equation, treating it as exogenous. Political rhetoric in the 1980s and
again this century has emphasized controlling debt and deficits by con-
trolling expenditures. Not all of the effort to control expenditures has
focused on transfer payments. The estimates show the coefficient on
purchases in the fiscal equation increasing sharply when the coefficient
on debt drops. We really can't be sure what is going on here without
more careful treatment of dynamics and recognition that purchases are
themselves likely to be responsive to debt and deficits.
The paper argues that regime switches can help with identification.
This is true in principle, but it depends on the maintained assumption
that we know something about when regimes switched, or in which
equations switches were likely to have occurred. The paper simply
assumes that what coefficient changes have occurred have been in the
policy behavior equations and that there are no simultaneity problems
that would lead to parameter change in the private sector being con-
founded with instability in the policy rule. The inflation of the 1970s
and high interest rates of the 1980s led to rapid financial innovation
and deregulation of the mortgage market. That these developments
changed the private sector's reaction to monetary policy actions seems
at least as likely as that the Federal Reserve realized only in 1980 that it
was responsible for controlling inflation.
The paper is a technical accomplishment that should provide a basis
for further research, but the complexity of the task it sets itself forces
a very ascetic specification for the policy rules. This is quarterly data,Comment 309
yet the policy rules are entirely contemporaneous, except for a one-
quarter lag on real debt in the fiscal equation and the use of four-
quarter averages for debt and inflation. It is well documented that vari-
ances of disturbances changed over this period. If the model specifica-
tion has overly restrictive dynamics or lists of variables, the shifting
disturbance variances will result in shifting specification error magni-
tudes and an illusion of parameter change.
3 Fit
It ought to be standard in empirical work to check the fit of the estimated
model. There is only one way to do this—construct an alternative model,
usually taken to be a less restricted model, and compare the two models'
abilities to explain the data. This amounts to calculating Bayesian poste-
rior odds on the models, or some approximation thereto. In many recent
papers in the literature this has been done by using reduced form BVARs
as standards of fit. We do not see any such check of fit in this paper. It is
likely, because the specification has necessarily been so tightly param-
eterized, that the model does not fit as well as a BVAR. But we would
like to know what the gap is. The paper shows plots of actual data vs.
one-step ahead model predictions. While this kind of plot is common in
the literature, it is uninformative. Close, in the eyeball sense, tracking of
serially correlated data like those in figures 4.1 and 4.2 is easily achieved
with naive no-change forecasts. The paper assures us that the plots
shown are "easily comparable" to those achieved in an earlier paper by
Taylor, but we are given no direct evidence of this, even in the form of
root mean squared error. We are not even told how the predictive accu-
racy of this model compares to that of a naive no-change forecast.
4 Existence and Uniqueness
Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2006) discuss existence and uniqueness
in linear regime-switching models, pointing out that in such models
it is possible for the class of probability-one bounded solutions with
bounded inputs and the class of stationary, bounded expectation solu-
tions under bounded inputs to be different. This is not true in purely
linear models with no regime-switching. In the paper at hand, Davig
and Leeper compute directly a set of nonlinear decision rules that con-
stitute a stationary solution to their model, and argue from numerical
results that it is at least locally, and probably globally, unique.310 Sims
The paper does not claim to have proved that its solutions are unique,
however, and this is an important gap. There is no argument based
on economic behavior to choose between almost surely bounded and
bounded-in-expectation solutions in linear models. In a fully specified
general equilibrium model such paths may or may not be ruled out by
considering feasibility or transversality conditions.
1 Davig and Leeper
show us how conclusions about the effects of monetary and fiscal pol-
icy are affected by regime switching in one equilibrium of their model.
But if the equilibrium is not unique, these results are not really a pre-
diction of their model. The model would in that case imply that other
results are also possible, and it could be these that matter for actual
applications.
Often uniqueness problems arise because there are equilibria in which
agents pay attention to an expanded state vector, so that elements of
this vector matter to the solution, even though there are also equilib-
ria in which they don't matter. In particular, indeterminacy of the time
path of prices often involves dependence of current prices or inflation
on past prices or inflation, even though there are equilibria in which
there is no such dependence. Sometimes such equilbria are pruned off
by appeal to McCallum's "minimum state vector" solution. There is
no justification within models for this way of eliminating solutions. In
some classes of models it can be claimed that the MSV is "learnable,"
while other solutions are not. But this rests on assuming that learning is
by least-squares dynamic regressions. Agents would be quite irrational
to use such learning rules if they believed that the explosive solutions
the MSV solution rules out in these cases were in fact possible. In an
economy with a history of high inflation episodes, agents may "learn"
that once inflation starts rising, one should extrapolate accelerating
inflation, rather than projecting future inflation as an average of the
past. Such agents will quickly "learn" explosive equilibria. DL solve
their model with an hypothesized state vector, which may well be a
"minimum" state vector, but have not proved that there are no other
equilibria with additional nominal history-dependence.
5 Long Rates
The paper refers to a point that has been emphasized by Cochrane, but
has been noted in a number of FTPL papers: If the government has long
as well as short debt, it can change the real value of outstanding nomi-
nal debt without changing the price level. The idea is that, if expectedComment 311
future primary surpluses rise, the resulting deflationary impact, as
agents try to trade real goods for nominal government liabilities, can
be offset by a decline in nominal rates, because this increases the mar-
ket value of long debt. The model in this paper does not include this
mechanism, and this could be important.
6 Endogenous Switching
Most people who think that policy changed dramatically and perma-
nently in late 1979 in the United States believe that it did so because
inflation appeared to be running out of control, not because an indepen-
dently evolving switching process happened to call for a change at that
date. Davig and Leeper note that this could be important and that they
don't allow for it. But for fitting data and estimating regime parameters,
this may matter less than you'd think. There are a rather small number
of estimated policy regime transitions. If we were to allow endogenous
switching, our estimates of how the parameters of the transition prob-
ability matrix P depend on the state would necessarily be imprecise,
and thus would have little impact on estimates of regimes.
In this paper the assumption of exogenous regime switching may
have a big impact not on estimates of regimes but on calculations of
impulse responses in the equilibrium model. For example, we may
believe (as the paper in fact suggests, informally) that if real debt gets
high enough, an active fiscal policy becomes a very high probability,
because of political economy bounds on tax rates. It is one of the lessons
of the paper that beliefs about what will happen in fairly remote con-
tingencies in the fairly distant future can affect the way the economy
behaves today. It would be interesting to see how sensitive this paper's
exercises with the equilibrium model might be to modifying the policy
rules so that they coincide with those estimated near the model steady
state, but tend endogenously to switch toward active fiscal policy at
high levels of debt and/or toward active monetary policy at high levels
of inflation and low debt. Estimation of such a specification would be
very difficult, but solving such an amended model using the methods
of this paper appears feasible.
7 Conclusion
This paper has made some by and large well chosen simplifying
assumptions in order to take a first step in a difficult area. The results312 Sims
are interesting. While the simplifying assumptions mean we should
treat the substantive conclusions cautiously, the possibility of relaxing
some of those assumptions opens up research possibilities.
Endnote
1. Simple examples of stable and unstable paths that are and are not equilibria in mon-
etary/fiscal models are worked out in Sims (1994).
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Andrew Levin remarked that the results of the paper implied that Alan
Greenspan's policy in 2002-2003 was essentially the same as the policy
of William G. Miller in 1977-1978. Levin felt that most observers would
agree that this was implausible and that this illustrated a pitfall in the
recurring regime setup employed by the authors.
Levin remarked that he was sympathetic to the main message of the
paper that the possibility of an active fiscal regime matters even dur-
ing periods when the fiscal regime is passive. Levin noted the parallel
between this result and the Peso Problem literature. He took the exam-
ple of Sweden, New Zealand, and Canada, all of which have been in an
inflation targeting regime for about 15 years and anticipate that they
will continue to target inflation for the next 15 years. He noted that it
is nevertheless possible that one of these countries will experience a
war or some other type of crisis that leads it to switch to an active fiscal
policy and perhaps even a passive monetary policy. He felt that it was
important to study how this type of Peso Problem affects price determi-
nation and the real economy today.
Greg Mankiw remarked that while this paper was an exercise in
positive economics, he felt that it might point the way towards a new
way of doing normative economics. He noted that ever since the Lucas
critique, there has been a disconnect between academics who think in
terms of policy rules and policy makers who think in terms of discre-
tionary actions. He felt that this type of analysis had the potential to
bridge the gap between these two world views. He suggested that pol-
icy makers might perhaps be thought of as deciding whether to switch
regimes with the knowledge that down the road a subsequent policy
maker might switch back.
Michael Woodford remarked on the assumption made by the authors
that policy regime switches were exogenous. He said that one type of314 Discussion
regime switch where this was perhaps a plausible assumption was the
change in regime that often accompanied the switch between peace
time and war time. He noted that war time has been associated with
policies that might best be characterized by the active fiscal-passive
monetary regime while peace time regimes were better described by
the passive fiscal-active monetary regime. He then noted that if this
description was realistic and a researcher wanted to analyze the behav-
ior of inflation and output during war time, then assuming that the war
time regime was permanent would be seriously misleading. The analy-
sis of the paper showed how to avoid making such an assumption.
Martin Eichenbaum followed up on Woodford's comment by citing
work by Ramey and Shapiro where they seek to identify exogenous
military events that lead to large changes in government purchases. He
noted that the response of the U.S. government after 9/11 was very dif-
ferent from the typical response found by Ramey and Shapiro to a large
military event. He felt that this suggested that there existed at least two
war time fiscal regimes.
Robert Gordon agreed that the fiscal regimes in different wars were
different. He noted that during WWI, the price level in all the major
combatant countries doubled or tripled, yet no countries had employed
price controls. He contrasted this with the experience during WWII
when price controls had been put on right away, allowing government
debt to become a free variable. He cited John Kenneth Galbraith's argu-
ment that the rationale for price controls during a war was that the sole
goal in wartime was the maximization of production and that this was
made possible by fiscal deficits. He then noted that the experience dur-
ing the Korean War had been very different from either of the World
Wars. Taxes had been raised before the government started spending
and the United States never ran big deficits during that war. He sug-
gested that each of these regimes represented learning from the past
one with different outcomes.
Daron Acemoglu asked whether the features of the data that led the
authors to estimate frequent regime changes could be due to non-lin-
earities. He remarked that if the answer was "yes," then the conclu-
sions of the previous literature about determinacy of equilibria should
be questioned much more severely since they would then be an artifact
of assuming a linear policy rule rather than more general policy rules.
Eric Leeper responded that he felt this issue was a serious one and that
the answer was an open issue.Discussion 315
Robert Gordon underlined Christopher Sims' caution about explosive
inflation. He remarked that when a country has a history of explosive
inflation, like Argentina and Brazil, it is unreasonable to expect expec-
tations to be formed with autoregressions. He suggested that in these
countries, agents look to the behavior of the fiscal authorities when
they form expectations about inflation. He said that when Argentina
tried to peg its currency to the dollar, its state and local governments
were spending money without restraint. He felt that astute observers
realized that Argentina could not possibly continue to peg to the dollar
for long, and indeed that regime collapsed.
Leeper took exception to Jordi Gall's comment that recurrence of
regimes was implausible. He emphasized that the argument that tax
cuts are the best way to retire debt just keeps coming back. He further-
more felt there was no reason to think that this argument would not
continue to come back, suggesting that recurrence was plausible for
fiscal regimes. He argued that economists have essentially no under-
standing of what determines fiscal policy and that this justified to some
extent their treatment of regime switches as being exogenous.
Regarding monetary policy, Leeper felt that the notion that the Fed-
eral Reserve was in an absorbing state had become an article of faith
among economists. He suggested that we had dodged a bullet in Ben
Bernanke's appointment as Chairman of the Fed, but that there would
be many more bullets to dodge in order to stay in that absorbing state.
He thought it was possible that the probability of going back to a passive
monetary policy was not as high as their estimates suggested, but that
this probability was certainly not zero and it was misleading to assume
that it was zero as much work in the recent literature has done.